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Abstract: This article examines one crucial period of contestation in colonial Suriname, the years 1941 
and 1942, when sustained labour unrest in the bauxite town of Moengo led to the establishment of the 
first mining unions. It argues that these strikes laid the groundwork for future relations between labour, 
the company and the state and explores the kinds of socio-political alliances that were forged between 
labour and nationalist politicians on the one hand, and government and the transnational company on 
the other, thereby situating this particular contestation in a larger struggle over a colonial system that 
aligned itself with metropolitan economic interests. Keywords: Suriname, bauxite sector, strikes, labour 
organization, trade unions, nationalist politics. 
 
I have the privilege to notify Your Excellency that Mr. Poot, the General Man-
ager of the Surinamese Bauxite Company, has announced that, among the 
Company’s work force [at mining town Moengo], a mobilization is once again 
underway to raise the wages to an amount of 50% [sic] and that, therefore, in 
case of non-accommodation, another strike is to be expected.  
It seems to me that this mobilization is organized better than the previous one, 
and that it has found its starting point in the dissatisfaction which is said to pre-
vail among the populace in Paramaribo. It appears that the mobilization is being 
staged by persons who have only recently returned from their leave in Paramar-
ibo.  
[Handwritten note in the margin by Governor Kielstra:] In light of the similar 
mobilization at Paranam [Suriname’s other mining site] last week, this points 
to Paramaribo as the centre of agitation.  
[Letter from the district commissioner of Marowijne, Mr. Postma, to Governor 
Kielstra, Moengo, 10 January 1942.]1 
As plantation economy scholars have argued, Caribbean societies such as Suri-
name have long been characterized by extremely dependent economies in which 
large metropolitan or multinational companies engaged in resource production and 
extraction play major roles (see Levitt and Best 1978; Best 2005; Girvan 1970, 
2006). Throughout the twentieth century, the bauxite industry, Suriname’s major 
industry and largest source of foreign currency, has played a crucial role in the 
country’s economy, making it a potent political arena. Mining unions became im-
portant political players and have been highly influential in terms of the organiza-
tion and legal regulation of labour relations, going beyond the confines of the min-
ing sector itself. 
 The above letter from District Commissioner Postma to Suriname’s Governor 
Kielstra speaks of a moment of intense contestation in colonial, wartime Suriname. 
The pending conflict went beyond bauxite workers and the Surinamese Bauxite 
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Company (SBM); it also involved the Surinamese government, local politicians 
and, allegedly, the discontented populace in Suriname’s capital city, Paramaribo. A 
few days after the letter was written, Moengo, Suriname’s premier bauxite mining 
location, was on strike. Using extensive wartime powers, the district commissioner 
stepped in to repress the strike and force employees to resume work. The Bauxite 
Company summarily fired eighty activists and sent them off to Paramaribo by boat. 
These same workers would become the founding members of Suriname’s first min-
ing union, which was established in Paramaribo mere weeks after the strike.  
 Based primarily on sources from the archives of the Governor of Suriname, this 
article examines the strikes of 1941 and 1942 that led to the formation of those 
unions. It argues that the strikes constitute a crucial period of contestation that laid 
the groundwork for future relations between labour, the company and the state. 
Besides an analysis of the strike, this article also explores the kinds of socio-
political alliances that were forged between labour and nationalist politicians on 
the one hand, and government and the transnational company on the other, thereby 
situating this particular contestation in a larger struggle against a colonial system 
that aligned itself with leading forces in what can justly be called a revamped plan-
tation economy.  
 I also discuss the economic and politically volatile 1930s, which provide the 
background to the heated altercations that took place in the early 1940s in 
Moengo’s mine and factory, as well as in the Surinaamse Staten, the local parlia-
ment. While these struggles took on a peculiar character on account of wartime pro-
visions and prohibitions, my subsequent discussion of another conflict situation in 
1954 makes clear that the alliance between state and company remained firmly in 
place after the war. Using secondary literature, newspaper reporting and some oral 
history data, the last section discusses the changing balance of power that resulted 
from labour organizing. It appears that, after decades of union successes, the Com-
pany increasingly found ways to countermand the many gains of organized labour.2 
Suriname’s bauxite 
Suriname, a Dutch colony until 1954 and part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
until 1975, is located on the north-eastern part of South America. It is often consid-
ered part of the mainland Caribbean on account of its history as a Dutch 
wingewest, an exploitation colony that was long dominated by large-scale sugar 
plantations. Bauxite, the raw material from which aluminium is made, became a 
major contributor to Suriname’s GDP and the predominant foreign currency earner 
mere years after the start of bauxite production in 1920. The importance of Suri-
name’s mining sector is duly noted in macro-economic reviews (see van Dijck 
2001), yet, with the exception of a number of activist studies in the 1980s, it has 
rarely been the subject of study.3 The literature on Moengo is even sparser. Impor-
tant sources are Hesselink’s little known but insightful socio-geographical study of 
Moengo in 1970 (1974) and a commemorative volume commissioned by SBM 
(Cor Lie a Kwie and Henk Esajas 1996) (see de Koning 2011 for a more general 
social history of Moengo). The early history of Suriname’s labour movement, and 
particularly that of the mining unions, remains similarly understudied (Campbell 
1987 focuses on Paramaribo-based unions in the postwar period). This article 
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therefore presents a provisional analysis of the socio-political significance of 
worker activism in the bauxite sector. 
 Concurrent with the steady decline of Suriname’s sugar industry in the late 
nineteenth, early twentieth century, large bauxite deposits were discovered, par-
ticularly in the eastern coastal plain of Suriname. Alcoa, already the major Ameri-
can bauxite company at the time, managed to gain widespread concessions in areas 
with bauxite deposits. It established a local subsidiary, the Surinaamsche Bauxiet 
Maatschappij (SBM; renamed Suralco in 1957) to mine the bauxite. The SBM was 
allowed to operate under extremely favourable conditions until the mid-70s. Re-
peated attempts to change these conditions were blocked by the Dutch government, 
who preferred to safeguard Dutch interests in the East Indies that renegotiation 
with American Alcoa could threaten (see Lamur 1985).  
 In 1920 SBM started mining bauxite at Moengo, an isolated site in the east of 
the country that until the completion of the east-west corridor in 1964 could only 
be reached by a long boat ride on the Cottica River (Lie a Kwie and Esajas 1996; 
Oudschans Dentz 1921). Over the years Moengo developed into a full-fledged 
company town, similar to the larger company town of Mackenzie in neighbouring 
Guyana (see Quamina 1987). In 1924 the Surinamese governor requested that 
management pass into Dutch hands. The new director, Ir. de Munnick, a Dutch 
engineer, quickly replaced the American staff with a predominantly Dutch staff. 
He apparently took these measures, ‘Because he was of the opinion that the work 
could not be carried out well with the Americans present in Moengo – they were 
leading a ‘rather free life’ and ‘did not adhere to the provisions of the law of the 
colony’ (Lie a Kwie and Esajas 1996, 49). This is an early example of the close 
cooperation between company and state that we will encounter in the context of the 
1941 and 1942 strikes. 
 The well-travelled Dutch bureaucrat and writer Frederik Oudschans Dentz vis-
ited Moengo in 1919 or 1920, when parts of the settlement were still under con-
struction. He was clearly very impressed by the American accomplishments and 
the modern organization of the production process, labour force and settlement. 
The settlement was designed for 1000 workers, who ‘with women and children’ 
would make up a population of 4000 persons (Oudschans Dentz 1921, 486). Draw-
ing upon their experiences with labour enclaves in areas such as Panama and Cuba, 
the Americans implemented a wide-ranging and highly advanced sanitary infra-
structure. This included a system for clean drinking water, indoor sanitary facilities 
and sewage system, anti-malaria measures and a hospital. A power station supplied 
electricity to the town, the factory and the water supply. Moengo’s modern infra-
structure apparently outshone that of Paramaribo, the capital city (1921, 488-90).  
 The early labour force consisted mainly of Creole craftsmen and contract la-
bourers from Java, complemented by Maroon and Amerindian lumber jacks from 
the immediate surroundings. Over the years, Javanese and Creole labourers contin-
ued to make up the majority of Moengo’s work force. Initially, the production 
process and the company town were organized strictly along racial lines. Even 
though race stopped being a formal organizing principle by the 1950s, the division 
of labour and concomitant social hierarchies continued to be inflected by race (see 
de Koning 2011). 
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 Around 1930 a more informal settlement that mainly housed Javanese labourers 
sprang up adjacent to the company-owned Moengo village. Wonoredjo was de-
clared an official village community in 1941.4 From that point onwards, Wonoredjo 
was officially governed by a village council that acted as intermediary between the 
government and the villagers and had an important say in village affairs, not least 
because it administered the use rights to the village grounds (see Ramsoedh 1990, 
112-3). In 1950 Moengo and Wonoredjo counted 2687 inhabitants, in 1964, 5320 
and in 1971, 6633 inhabitants.5 
 Until the 1940s Moengo was the centre of mining activity in Suriname. That 
started to change in 1939 with the development of a second SBM mining location 
on the Suriname River upstream from Paramaribo at Paranam. In 1941 the Dutch 
Billiton company also initiated mining activities in Suriname at Onverdacht, close 
to the Paranam site. As a result, the centre of gravity of Suriname’s mining sector 
gradually shifted away from Moengo to Paranam-Onverdacht. This shift was 
strengthened when, in the early 1960s, a hydroelectric dam, an alumina factory and 
an aluminium smelter were built at Paranam, and financed by Suralco in exchange 
for new bauxite concessions (Lie a Kwie and Esajas 1996, 80ff.). While Paranam 
and Onverdacht also developed into company towns, both sites remained relatively 
small as their proximity to the city allowed workers to commute from Paramaribo 
(de Bruijne 1976, 72-3). 
 Moengo remained an important hub of bauxite production and a vibrant little 
town. Mining came to dominate the otherwise sparsely populated district of Ma-
rowijne. In 1964, 61 per cent of its total employed male population worked in the 
mining sector.6 By the 1980s easily accessible bauxite reserves close to Moengo 
were almost depleted. Military rule, which had been established in 1980, combined 
with the decreased competitiveness of Surinamese bauxite led to a tightening of 
investments from Alcoa, Suralco’s mother company.7 In 1984 the company suf-
fered losses for the first time in its history, and implemented a voluntary retrench-
ment plan (Lie a Kwie and Esajas 1996, 200-1). The Interior War, a prolonged 
armed conflict that lasted from the mid-80s to the early 1990s between the 
state/regime and Maroon factions located in the rainforest interior, led to a tempo-
rary cessation of all mining activity and the exodus of most inhabitants in 1986. 
Production was resumed after a few months, but operations were restructured and 
managed with a significantly smaller workforce, and many parts of the production 
process were outsourced to labour contractors. Mines in the vicinity of Moengo 
had already been abandoned, but mining did continue at more distant mines.8  
Local contestations 
An account of the turbulent 1920s, based on the 1929 notes of SBM pioneer Bur-
side, gives an indication of the volatility of the early relations between the com-
pany and (yet-to-be-organized) labour (Burside 1986, 4). In January 1920 about 
100 carpenters and labourers at Moengo went on strike, demanding higher wages. 
They were apparently summarily fired, since, as Burside dryly notes, the number 
of personnel was reduced from 256 to 156 (ibid.). The number of labourers again 
increased sharply in the course of 1920 to 1013, including 251 Javanese contract 
labourers who arrived between March and August of that year. In November of 
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that same year 300 workers went on strike. They were apparently again summarily 
fired. In 1921 and 1922 the company made further drastic cutbacks, until only a 
handful of free labourers were left besides the Javanese who were tied to their five-
year contracts (Burside 1986, 4-5). In the following years, the company again 
started expanding its workforce. In December 1925 it had 880 employees (ibid.). 
 In the 1930s the global economic crisis caused massive unemployment and 
impoverishment in Suriname. In response, several organizations were founded to 
advance the interests of the impoverished working class and legions of unem-
ployed (Scholtens 1986). As in other parts of the Caribbean, skilled labour mi-
grants who had returned to Suriname from work in Curaçao’s petrol industry and 
to a lesser extent from jobs in Guyana played a crucial role in these mobilizations 
(Scholtens 1986, 54-6; Bolland 2001, 358). They were inspired by experiences 
with trade unions abroad and, as Scholtens points out, taken aback by the levels of 
unemployment and poverty in Surname. The organizations they helped found can 
be seen as crossovers between unions and political organizations, and mainly 
pleaded for the creation of jobs and poverty relief. In 1931 a meeting organized by 
the Surinaamse Volksbond ended in heavy clashes between protestors and police, 
which became known as the Hongeroproer (Hunger Revolt). In 1932 the increas-
ingly active Surinaamsche Algemeene Werkers Organisatie, founded in the previ-
ous year, was dissolved by the colonial government. Social unrest and clashes be-
tween population and government reached their zenith with the arrival of Surinam-
ese activist Anton de Kom from the Netherlands and his subsequent arrest early in 
1933 (Scholtens 1986, 54ff; Ramsoedh 1990, 31-8). In response to popular protests 
and militancy, the governor submitted a number of ‘anti-revolutionary decrees’ 
pertaining to sanctions on crimes against public order and the authorities, as well as 
regulations concerning gatherings and publications (Ramsoedh 1990, 38). These 
decrees were similar to those that would be issued in response to labour rebellions 
in the second half of the 1930s in other Caribbean countries (Bolland 2001, 363). 
The years that followed were relatively calm due to repressive measures on the part 
of the authorities, particularly the new governor J.C. Kielstra (Ramsoedh 1990, 83-
9; Scholtens 1986, 104).  
 Nigel O. Bolland (2001, 363) argues that colonial governments throughout the 
British Caribbean responded to the labour rebellions by combining police action, 
limited concessions and attempts to institutionalize and control the labour move-
ment. Unlike the rest of the Caribbean (Bolland 2001; Bryan 2004), in Suriname 
the labour rebellions did not result in significant institutionalization of the labour 
movement, let alone its incorporation by the state. With a limited number of trade 
unions and worker associations, Suriname’s pre-war labour movement is seen as 
nascent and devoid of real influence (Ramsoedh 1990, 135). Further research is 
needed to determine the exact reasons behind these diverging paths. Was it the 
different political-economic makeup of Suriname compared to, for example, Guy-
ana or Trinidad, that resulted in a smaller industrial working class? Or was it the 
latter’s stronger history of labour organizing, reaching back into the late nineteenth 
century (Hart 1988)? Or was Governor Kielstra’s control of the country exception-
ally tight? Whatever the exact causes, by the early 1940s, things seem to have 
changed. The development of additional mining locations at Paranam and Onver-
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dacht and the tremendous importance of Suriname’s bauxite for the American war 
industry seemed to have tipped the balance in favour of labour.  
 The economic crisis caused a temporary slump in bauxite production, and a 
reduction of the number of employees from 700 to 290 in the early 1930s (Lie a 
Kwie and Esajas 1996, 68). It is not clear whether there were any significant strikes 
in the bauxite sector during those years, nor do I know whether bauxite workers 
played a role in the popular protests. By the late 1930s production had picked up, 
and in 1942 it reached unprecedented heights due to the heavy demand from the 
US war industry (ESWIN 1956, 119; Lie a Kwie and Esajas 1996, 72ff.). Because 
of the importance of Suriname’s bauxite to the American war efforts – in 1940 
some 60 per cent of the bauxite used by the American war industry came from Su-
riname (Fontaine 1986, 16) – American soldiers had been temporarily stationed in 
Suriname to protect bauxite production and transport, among other places at 
Moengo (Ramsoedh 1990, 166ff.).  
 During the early years of the Second World War, Suriname experienced a steep 
rise in wage levels, due to increased demand for labour owing to construction ac-
tivities undertaken by the American military and the expansion of bauxite produc-
tion (Ramsoedh 1990, 155), as well as mandatory wartime recruitment for the 
Schutterij (National Guard) and labour recruitment for work at the oil refineries in 
the Antilles (Lie a Kwie and Esajas 1996, 104-5; Lutchman 1986). Yet for most, 
higher wages could not keep up with the concurrent price hikes of both imported and 
locally produced goods, a situation that was exacerbated by a number of extra tax 
measures. Especially those on fixed wages were hit hard (Ramsoedh 1990, 151-3).  
 A heated debate in the Staten concerning the granting of a bauxite concession 
to Billiton Company on 10 July 1941 provides an indication of the labour unrest 
that would break out that same month.9 The governor was appointed directly by the 
Netherlands Minister of Colonies; the Staten acted as Suriname’s representative 
body. At the time 10 of its 15 members were chosen by an electorate drastically 
restricted by census suffrage; five members were appointed by the governor (Ram-
soedh 1990, 133ff.). Several Staten members critiqued what they saw as exces-
sively low wages and poor labour conditions. Member Kraan described the unbear-
able conditions in which workers at Smalkalden, where Billiton was building har-
bour facilities, were expected to work. His impassioned speech then turned to the 
company’s refusal to grant a pay raise to those labouring away in the swamps, 
among others resorting to the argument that the Government pays its labourers 
even less, and that it wouldn’t want higher pages to be paid. While, according to 
him, ‘Asian wages’ [wages paid to former contract labourers] thwarted the pay-
ment of reasonable wages in the agricultural sector, the bauxite sector should have 
room for reasonable pay. Members Zaal and Schneiders-Howard also pointed to 
the meagre wages paid by SBM. In line with what seems to have been a common 
view, they accused the government of attempting to keep wages in the private sec-
tor down. Reacting to what it considered a tenacious rumour, the government ve-
hemently denied any interference from governmental side in the setting of wages in 
the private sector. Whatever the truth of these allegations at the time, two years 
later a meeting was indeed called with government officials, directors of major 
companies and representatives of the Dutch and American armies to agree on 
maximum wages (Lie a Kwie and Esajas 1996, 106-7). 
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Moengo on strike 
Against the background of rising costs of living in the early 1940s, Moengo ex-
perienced months of labour unrest and a major strike. This moment not only pre-
sents a landmark in terms of labour contestation and organization, but since it left 
such a rich documentary record,10 it also presents us with an incisive case study of 
the relations between company management, workers and the state. To a large ex-
tent I rely on the extensive reporting of J. Postma, the district commissioner (DC) 
for the Marowijne district. The DC was the local representative of the colonial gov-
ernment in the Marowijne district, and functioned as the highest local authority. He 
was in close contact not only with the governor, but also with SBM plant manager. 
 In August 1941 a strike broke out when the usual annual wage increase had not 
been granted and a cost of living allowance had been cancelled, even though living 
costs had increased significantly. Furthermore, because of expanded production, 
most jobs in the bauxite sector had become more demanding (Lie a Kwie and Esa-
jas 1996, 99-102). On Monday 4 August 1941, the shovel operators were the first 
to go on strike followed by the mill, shipping, and towboat crews, all of which 
were ended after substantial wage increases had been offered.11 At the mill, the 
system of two shifts was replaced by a three shift system, which meant a reduction 
from a 12 to an 8-hour workday. Powerhouse personnel were granted a raise with-
out a strike, while the electric shop personnel received a very substantial wage in-
crease of 30 to 40 per cent after the mere threat of a strike. DC Postma emphasizes 
that their wages were indeed rather low. Personnel of the building and upkeep sec-
tion also demanded a substantial wage increase (some 40 cents on a wage of 50 
cents per hour). However, their demands were ignored and a number of men were 
fired. In the afternoon, the mining personnel also went on strike. What happened 
afterwards is not mentioned. On 6 August, the DC reported that, for the time being, 
the strike had ended.  
 In a letter dated 11 August 1941, the DC reported that the main cause of the 
strike had indeed been the increased pressure due to expanded production and the 
rise in living costs, which had gone without any compensation.12 It was no coinci-
dence that the strike had started with the shovel operators. Since their work re-
quired extensive training, they could not easily be replaced. According to the DC, 
advertisements for employment in Curaçao had surely contributed to their readi-
ness to strike. The latter point was also brought up in a meeting between Governor 
Kielstra and his staff and SBM General Manager De Greve and Alcoa executive 
Cuff in November of 1941. At this meeting, the governor mentions a draft regula-
tion that would ban certain skilled labourers from leaving the country.13 This regu-
lation was indeed implemented a few months later, when another strike broke out. 
 In January 1942, Moengo workers demanded, but were refused, another wage 
increase of 50 per cent. They seem to have also had grievances related to housing, 
medical treatment, leave and potable water.14 In the January 10 letter quoted earlier, 
DC Postma writes to Governor Kielstra that the SBM plant manager has recently 
informed him of the likelihood of a strike, since the company was not willing to 
comply with renewed demands for wage increases.15 Postma asks the governor to 
implement a number of wartime regulations designed to secure production in sensi-
tive sectors, such as those discussed in the governor’s meeting with Alcoa execu-
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tives. He requests the governor uses his extended powers based on the General 
Authority Measure [Gouvernements Besluit] of 1941 to oblige all employees to 
continue their duties as normal under the directions of the DC. He, moreover, asks 
the governor to issue a regulation that would prohibit those workers who were laid 
off to leave Suriname for employment in Curaçao or Venezuela. He clearly thought 
these measures would decrease labour’s bargaining power and help quell labour 
unrest.  
 In a second letter dated 19 January 1942, the DC gives the governor an account 
of the course of the strike.16 On Saturday morning, 17 January, a number of sus-
pected strike leaders were arrested as a preventive measure, he reports. Personnel 
from the electric shop and a crew responsible for the trenches had to be escorted to 
their worksites by the military, who supervised their work for a few hours. The 
shovels in the mine were operated by a foreman and a few American soldiers. Ac-
cording to the DC this dealt a significant blow to the strike, since shovel operators 
had again been at the centre of the strike. As the electric shop workers before them, 
dock personnel had to be escorted to their posts. When those who were escorted to 
the docks still refused to work, three persons were arrested and the rest were force-
fully put to work. By afternoon, a total of 24 persons had been arrested. The next 
evening, on Sunday 18 January, the DC gave a radio address.17 After mentioning 
the current battles of the allied forces in Asia, Postma switched to Moengo’s strik-
ing workers. According to the DC, these were: 
...well-dressed, well-housed and well-fed workers, who have up to now been 
spared the horrors of war.... It pays to calculate how many planes are produced 
out of every ship of bauxite that leaves Moengo. Therefore, anyone who, by at-
tempting to strike, obstructs ships from leaving fully loaded and on time, is, I 
trust without realizing it, a traitor to our cause, a fifth columnist.... That’s why, 
if you refuse to be more prudent,... I will use all means necessary to keep the 
bauxite company at Moengo going; and I possess such means. A General Au-
thority Measure has recently been taken that opens the possibility to force any-
one employed at certain companies or institutions to go to work. Violation of 
this legal measure is punishable with a jail sentence of maximum five years.  
According to the DC, this led a majority to see the error of their ways. On Monday, 
an increasing number of workers wanted to get back to work. The strike seemed to 
have been suppressed; at least 80 people had been fired.18 A telegram from SBM to 
Alcoa Executive Cuff mentioned that 65 ‘undesirables, mostly younger men’ had 
been removed from the plant site. 19  
 In a letter dated 28 January 1942, DC Postma reported that production had re-
turned to normal, yet there was still a great deal of bad blood among the popula-
tion. There was a broadly shared distrust and bitterness towards Europeans in gen-
eral and the staff and the DC himself in particular, he wrote.20 The members of the 
governmental committee charged with looking into the background and handling 
of the strike were said to relay the names of those involved to the company execu-
tive. A subordinate asked a staff member not to talk to him in public, and the usual 
football matches between the Dutch military and a team of workers were cancelled 
at the latter’s request. The contingent of Javanese soldiers stationed at Moengo had 
apparently planned to join the strike to protest their low wages. But, the DC has-
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tened to add, there is no anti-Government feeling and the local population is loyal. 
He concluded that ‘The military intervention, whose necessity is not yet under-
stood, has caused bad blood. They [the local population] feel unappreciated, but 
they don’t understand what every lost hour of bauxite-production means to our 
armies at war’. 
 The effects of the strike reverberated long after the actual strike had died down. 
The dismissed workers arrived in Paramaribo on 20 January 1942. On 1 February, 
a group that called itself the Surinamese Miners Union (SMU) held its first general 
assembly, followed by another meeting on 1 March where a motion was carried to 
rehire the dismissed employees. That same evening, the Moengo Mijnwerkers 
Bond (MMB, Moengo Miners Union) was established at a meeting in Moengo. 
Unions at Paranam and Billiton followed. The three mining unions later formed the 
Surinamese Miners Union (Lie a Kwie and Esajas 1996, 100-2). In September 
1946, against the background of a temporary slump in bauxite production, Paranam 
workers went on strike to demand higher wages and a vacation plan. The strike 
soon spread to Moengo and Billiton. After agreements about a higher wage and 
cost of living allowance, work was resumed in November of that same year 
(Fontaine 1986, 17).  
 The Moengo and Paranam strikes occasioned some of the first social legislation 
aimed at regulating labour agreements and conflicts (Lie a Kwie and Esajas 1996, 
100-2). The recommendations made in the report on the strikes at Moengo led to 
the introduction of a bill meant to regulate labour relations in industrial companies 
(i.e. the bauxite industry). The 1946 Paranam strike led to the institution of a na-
tional Mediation Board that is still operative (Lie a Kwie and Esajas 1996, 1012; 
Campbell 1987, 109). One of its first decisions was very favourable for SBM em-
ployees: they would receive a 20 to 30 per cent pay rise, the company would as-
sume the full amount of pension payments, housing would be improved and local 
employees would be considered for promotion (Campbell 1987, 111).  
 The clashes between bauxite workers and the company inaugurated a marked 
shift in labour relations. Wartime conditions were highly favourable for the alli-
ance between the bauxite company and the colonial state. It allowed the state to 
depict worker resistance as the equivalent of siding with the enemy and gave it 
extensive executive powers to break the strike. Yet, despite labour’s short-term 
loss, this contestation between labour and company precipitated the formation of 
the mining unions, which signified a permanent institutional shift that empowered 
the workers and tilted the balance of power in favour of labour, at the expense of 
the bauxite company. As I argued earlier, the expansion of bauxite production due 
to the development of the Paranam and Onverdacht locations, as well as the in-
creased importance of bauxite due to heavy demand from the American war indus-
try might have provided labour with crucial leverage. The standoff between labour 
and the transnational company in the bauxite industry furthermore provoked gov-
ernment intervention and eventually led to the creation of a legal framework for the 
regulation of future labour relations, thereby following similar developments in the 
British West Indies (see Bolland 2001). 
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Debating the colonial 
Staten debates in the early 1940s evidence a contestation of the colonial order in 
which concerns over social and labour conditions coalesced with disaffection with 
colonial government. Relations between governor and Staten that had been tense 
for decades grew sour when Governor Kielstra displayed an increasingly autocratic 
manner of rule. Particularly galling was his insistence on his verindisching poli-
cies, which had been inspired by his experience in the Dutch East Indies. Breaking 
with previous assimilation policies, these policies were specifically directed toward 
the advancement of the Asian, and more specifically Javanese, part of the popula-
tion. They included the Village Community Act, discussed above in connection with 
Wonoredjo, as well as the Asian Marriage Act, which ratified legal pluralism with 
respect to family law, and the restriction of higher government functions to people 
with experience in the Dutch East Indies (Ramsoedh 1990, 139-45). Kielstra’s verin-
disching policies met with dogged resistance from the Surinaamse Staten, which was 
dominated by urban-based elites. Concurrently, anti-colonial sentiment and hopes for 
more autonomy were kindled by the drafting of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 which 
discussed people’s right to self-determination and a radio address by the Dutch queen 
in 1942 that mentioned a restructured kingdom (Ramsoedh 1990, 179-86). In this 
climate, several vocal Staten members positioned themselves as representatives of 
Surinamese workers against the allied forces of blunt profit-seeking companies and 
a heavy-handed, repressive governor, representing colonial interests. 
 After the 1942 strike in Moengo, the governor installed a committee to examine 
the conflict and investigate the grievances of the workers. This committee pre-
sented a confidential report to the Staten. The Staten also received addresses by the 
Surinamese Workers Federation and by four dismissed workers on behalf of the 
entire group, asking for action on behalf of those still unemployed. In a heated de-
bate on 11 June 1942, several members criticized the confidential nature of the 
report, arguing that the unprotected labourers had expected more transparency.21 
Member de Miranda: ‘Doesn’t the labour peace in this country demand that those 
willing to work who cannot be blamed for anything but wanting to better their eco-
nomic position, are reinstated in their jobs after the causes of said conflict have 
ceased to exist? Is it not a responsibility of the Government to intervene, if neces-
sary with use of force, which the Government has applied on so many other ter-
rains since the start of the war?’22 De Miranda and his colleagues Zaal and Bos 
Verschuur also asked whether the Authority Measure that forbids the dissolution of 
a labour agreement in the bauxite sector without the express permission of the dis-
trict commissioner did not equally apply to the company. The governor responded 
that, indeed, both company and labourer needed governmental permission to end 
their labour relation. This seems to have been a mere formality; in the same mis-
sive he mentioned that he has tried to intercede on behalf of the dismissed workers, 
but that the company did not agree on rehiring them. ‘After all it is difficult for the 
government to judge to what extent the rehiring of certain labourers is to be con-
sidered undesirable for the daily routine in the company,’ he notes.23 
 Throughout the Caribbean, alliances between workers movements and causes 
and middle class politics were taking shape. On account of the overlap between 
race, class and colonial/national hierarchies, issues like the treatment of workers 
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could easily translate into criticism of racial discrimination or metropolitan arro-
gance. Workers’ bread-and-butter grievances morphed into middle class political 
objections to aspects of the colonial order. In many cases, institutionalized workers 
movements formed the basis for, or were co-opted by, nationalist political parties 
(see Knight 2004, Bryan 2004, Bolland 2001, Sutton 2005). Karla Slocum, for ex-
ample, argues that we can read conflicts such as the 1957 St. Lucia sugar strike in 
terms of decolonization, in which St. Lucia saw ‘the rising power of a politically 
active Afro-St. Lucian middle-class group that, with a shift in the form of colonial 
administration on the island, had become simultaneously engaged in labour orga-
nizing and leadership within St. Lucia’s newly formed political parties’ (2007, 41).  
 In Suriname, workers’ federations founded in the late 1930s played a prominent 
role in the nomination of candidates for the elections of 1941 and 1946, thus func-
tioning as voters’ associations (Campbell 1987, 76-7). This connection between 
unions and political parties grew stronger and more intricate in the years following 
World War II, when Suriname’s political life came into its own with the implemen-
tation of universal suffrage in 1948 and partial autonomy in 1954. Politicians pur 
sang such as Jopie Pengel and Eddy Bruma took over from what Campbell de-
scribed as socially engaged intellectuals like Bos Verschuur and Hellstone, who 
took the lead in labour organization and political representation in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s (1987, 121-2).  
 In 1940s-Suriname, the Staten’s most vocal members were well-known public 
figures who were not only influential inside, but perhaps even more outside, par-
liament. Member Kraan was the founder of Suriname’s oldest newspaper still in 
print, De West, and a veteran Staten member. Schneiders-Howard was the first 
female Staten member and an active and vocal social reformist (Hoefte 2007). Par-
ticularly the presence of de Miranda and Bos Verschuur in the Staten marked a 
growing influence of nationalist and socialist thinking in the Staten (Ramsoedh 
1990, 147-8). Both de Miranda and Bos Verschuur played a leading role in the 
nascent union movement. De Miranda, a well-known lawyer, was involved in the 
establishment of the Miners’ Union in 1942 (Campbell 1987, 75). Wim Bos Ver-
schuur, an art teacher and prominent public figure, had been a founder of two 
workers’ federations: in 1941 he established, with de Miranda, the above men-
tioned Surinamese Workers’ Federation that sent an address to the Staten concern-
ing the fate of the dismissed SBM workers (Breeveld 2004, 48-51; Campbell 1987, 
63). Bos Verschuur had also been a key organizer of a petition against the gover-
nor. In 1943, a year after he became a member of the Staten, Governor Kielstra had 
him arrested and interned on charges of subversion (Ramsoedh 1990, 193-8; 
Breeveld 2004, 66-93).  
 As in St. Lucia and other parts of the Caribbean, it seems that Suriname’s 
emergent political elite used working conditions and strikes as political platforms 
to critique colonial policy, particularly the autocratic rule Governor Kielstra. While 
ostensibly about labour relations and worker conditions, the Staten debates can 
thus also be read as a battle over power and hierarchy in colonial Suriname. Critical 
Staten members, part of the new political elite, aligned themselves with the powerful 
forces of about-to-be organized labour in the bauxite industry against Dutch colonial 
rule, most obviously in the person of the governor, who was seen to be in question-
able collaboraton with the executives of the country’s largest companies.  
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Colonial collaborations 
This in-depth look into one standoff between a company, the state and labour has 
to be situated in its specific moment: World War II. While the extension of guber-
natorial powers and the active military cooperation between the Surinamese Baux-
ite Company, local colonial government and the US Army were surely a wartime 
feature, many other aspects of this particular contestation seem to have been rather 
typical of the close contact and cooperation between the state and the company at 
the time. As much becomes clear when we consider another less known, but 
equally well-documented incident in 1954 in which the colonial government sup-
ported the company by sending soldiers to maintain order and productivity. 24  
 On 17 June 1954, an altercation occurred between Mr. Ashby, an American 
staff member, and Mr. Stein, a field mechanic. The altercation started when Ashby 
caught Stein circulating a petition and eliciting signatures in connection with the 
upcoming union elections during work hours. Stein was summarily fired. Ashby’s 
planned transfer to Paranam was advanced by a few months, most likely to prevent 
further incidents. According to SBM Director Ir. Meijer the altercation happened in 
an already somewhat volatile atmosphere, which, in his opinion, was primarily due 
to the union elections, and only to a lesser extent to the upcoming general elec-
tions. In a letter to Governor Klaasesz, dated 26 June 1954, Director Meijer men-
tions that SBM executives had defended Stein’s dismissal at a heated meeting with 
workers. According to Meijer, they were able to appease the crowd.25 Afterwards 
Stein wrote to Director Meijer pleading his case, which was accompanied by a let-
ter from the union supporting Stein’s request for leniency. Meijer responded that it 
had been a measured decision and that he saw no reason to reverse it. He expressed 
confidence in the union board’s ability to see the fairness of the decision and con-
vince the union members.26  
 At a union meeting two days later the relatively complacent members sitting on 
the board were challenged by a more radical faction. While it was not able to un-
seat the sitting board, it did manage to move the union to request wage increases. 
Around the same time, anonymous warnings reached Director Meijer concerning 
serious threats of violence against staff members as well as involving the dynamite 
storage.27 Upon a request from the DC, Governor Klaasesz detached a contingent of 
18 soldiers to Moengo on 26 June. Director Meijer and Police Commander Doug-
las arrived at Moengo the next morning. They soon learned that senior staff mem-
bers had serious doubts regarding the veracity of the alarming messages. It turned 
out that the wife of the plant manager, who had suffered a nervous breakdown, had 
fabricated and relayed the alarming messages to her husband, who in turn had for-
warded them to the director. On 28 June the plant manager and his wife were qui-
etly sent abroad on what Governor Klaasesz describes as ‘a so-called vacation; 
they, however, will not return to Suriname’.28 In a second letter to the governor 
dated 30 June 1954, Director Meijer argues that, notwithstanding the falsification 
of the rumours, Police Commander Douglas was convinced that the reinforced po-
lice presence, the arrival of soldiers and the strict disciplinary measures taken by 
the company had exerted a salutary influence. Meijer further mentions that thanks 
to Police Commander Douglas, the company will have six policemen in training at 
its disposal until the general elections on 22 July. The costs of their presence will 
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be covered by the company.29  
 Governor Klaasesz ended his report to the Dutch minister responsible for the 
Dutch territories overseas regarding ‘the situation at Moengo’ by stating that, fol-
lowing his advice, the company had postponed planned cut backs until after the 
election, because these would have meant the dismissal of ‘a number of political 
ringleaders’.30 Rather than a wartime aberration, the close cooperative relation be-
tween the company and the government seems more like a regular feature of colo-
nial Suriname. As the 1954 case evidences, the state and the company – governor 
and director, DC and plant manager – maintained close relations and amicably ar-
ranged issues of security, control and sovereignty between them. They were allies 
in their quest for order, productivity and control and pacification of the labour force.  
 However, whereas the closeness between the state and the company is reminis-
cent of the 1940s, the ubiquitous presence of the union presents a striking change. 
SBM’s handling of the Stein case illustrates the growing importance of the union 
as a major actor, as did the company’s monitoring of different factions within the 
union. Clearly, the SBM executive saw the union as a force to reckon with, as well 
as a possible ally.  
Organized gains and losses 
When I first went [to Moengo, in 1950] there was no union. Those Americans 
could fire you from one moment to the next. They called that ‘down the river’. 
After ’50 that Union came. And it improved a lot. But they [the bauxite work-
ers] have also become more demanding…. They really don’t earn that badly, 
and the privileges they have, others don’t. So I keep saying, Suralconians 
shouldn’t complain [Nurse Fernandes, former director of Moengo hospital and 
Suralco staff member, interview in Paramaribo, August 2008]. 
Nurse Fernandes’ evaluation of the influence of the mining union reflected com-
mon sentiments among the Moengonese I interviewed as part of my research on 
Moengo’s social history (De Koning 2011). On the one hand, the union was seen 
as instrumental in combating the company’s arbitrary omnipotence, but, as Mr. 
‘K.’, an insightful observer and old-time Suralconian remarked, the union’s many 
gains also initiated company strategies to circumvent the union’s power.  
 The war years and their immediate aftermath inaugurated a history of strong 
labour organization and contestation concerning wages, facilities and labour rela-
tions, as well as at times national politics in the mining enclaves. In 1948 the Suri-
namese Mining Union, which united the Moengo, Paranam and Billiton unions, 
was, with 2200 members, by far the biggest labour organization in the country 
(Campbell 1987, 268). Moengo’s workforce had a very high degree of unioniza-
tion. In 1963 the MMB had 700 members, out of a workforce of around 1,000 (Lie 
a Kwie and Esajas 1996, 98). In 1974 the mining sector was estimated to have the 
second highest degree of membership in the country, 67 per cent, and a total of 
some 5,000 union members (Campbell 1987, 62). In 1984 the mining unions were 
one of the few organized forces that were able to take an effective stance against 
the military regime (Campbell 1999; Buddingh’ 1995, 334-5; Anton de Kom-
Abraham Behr Instituut 1985).  
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 Organized labour in the bauxite sector was able to press for improvements in 
wages, facilities and job security, as well as, less tangibly, work relations. In 1966 
the MMB concluded the first collective labour agreement in Surinamese history, 
which institutionalized negotiations between employers and employees at the level 
of the company. According to Campbell, unions in large foreign enterprises, first 
and foremost in the bauxite sector, were able to realize substantial gains for their 
members. Their success presents a sharp contrast with the limited achievements of 
unions active in local companies, which has given rise to a dichotomy in terms of 
working conditions and pay (1987, 129). The precise impact of the relatively 
strong labour organizations in the mining sector on conditions of employment and 
labour relations nationwide is a question for further research. With respect to Car-
ibbean economies more generally, Girvan (1970) notes that income from bauxite 
production served to finance high-income enclaves not only in the mining sector, 
but also in the government bureaucracy. This resulted in an even greater depend-
ence on mining. Did Suriname finance its bureaucracy in a similar manner and did 
it thereby also become doubly dependent on bauxite revenues? 
 As an organized force, bauxite workers were able to make many gains in terms 
of job security, wages and social and health benefits. Yet, as Mr. K. noted, many of 
these gains seem to have been countermanded by a creeping disinvestment on the 
part of the company, as well as its tendency to increasingly resort to outsourcing. 
From the 1970s onward the company seems to have slowly but surely substituted 
its earlier role as stern paternalistic provider with that of merely an employer, get-
ting rid of most of its extensive facilities. It also resorted to increasingly far-
reaching outsourcing of parts of the production process, thereby effectively under-
cutting organized labour and significantly reducing labour costs. While in 1964 
only 2 per cent of those active in the mining sector worked as casual labourer, be-
tween 2002 and 2006, the number of directly employed personnel went down from 
some 60 to less than 40 per cent (Census 1964; Ferrier 2007, 24).  
 Outsourcing effectively led to insecure working conditions reminiscent of pre-
union times. In 2008 Suralco’s outsourcing policy became a hotly contested issue 
on the work floor, in the newspapers and in national politics (see DWT 
18/APR/2008). In 2009 pressure from workers, public opinion and the government 
eventually resulted in a compromise regarding Suralco’s responsibility for the em-
ployment conditions of contract labourers (DWT 26/SEP/2009). This small victory 
notwithstanding, it seems that rather than the capitalist enclaves that Girvan observed 
as typical of Caribbean economies, we see the expansion of a large grey zone of 
flexible labour around an increasingly small core of well paid, secure employees. 
Conclusion 
Because of its macroeconomic importance, strategic nature and not least the highly 
skilled and organized proletariat that came into being in the mining enclaves, the 
bauxite industry has constituted an important political arena in twentieth century 
Suriname. This article has focused on one crucial period of contestation, the 
Moengo strikes of 1941 and 1942 that led to the establishment of the mining un-
ions. The 1941 and 1942 strikes at Moengo and their aftermath showed not only 
the strength of the alliance between the state and the bauxite company, but also an 
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emergent partnership between more critical Paramaribo-based politicians and pub-
lic figures on the one hand, and vocal workers on the other. Political mobilization 
and workers activism went hand in hand; critiques of Governor Kielstra’s heavy-
handed rule and his metropolitan political directives reverberated with workers’ 
demands for better wages and working conditions. The Moengo strikes were there-
fore not only crucial in the domain of labour relations, but also signalled the further 
integration of labour and political activism. They thereby became part of the larger 
contestation of the colonial order in wartime Suriname, and laid the foundation for 
more intricate alliances and mobilization in the decades to come.  
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Notes 
1. Nationaal Archief (NA), Archief van de Gouverneur van Suriname: Afdeling Kabinet Geheim, 
1885-19A51 (AGS/KG 1885-1951), Inventory no. 516; Letter no. 2. All translations by the author. 
2. For more on these interviews and the interviewees, see de Koning 2011. 
3. In the context of the left-wing climate of the 1970s and 1980s and the then popular dependencia 
theories, Suriname’s bauxite industry became the focal point of left-wing political criticism. See 
Anton de Kom-Abraham Behr Instituut (1985) and van Klaveren (1974). 
4. Verslag der Handelingen van de Staten van Suriname (Handelingen), 1941-1942, p. 98 and Bijla-
gen (24, 1-3). 
5. Statistical data about the number of inhabitants and percentages of those employed in mining were 
computed from the 1950, 1964 and 1971 censuses. Due to several changes in the census districts 
between 1950 and 1964 and the differential treatment of ‘bushland population’ in all the three given 
years, the data are not fully comparable. 
6. Taken from the 1964 Census, this figure excludes a large share of the district’s population that was 
not included in the census since it concerned people considered to be ‘living in tribes’ (in stamver-
band levend). 
7. Interview with Suralco Executive Warren Pederson, Paramaribo 2008. Lie a Kwie and Esajas (1996, 
199) date Alcoa’s increased reluctance to invest in its Surinamese operations to the late 1980s. 
8. February 2010 update on Suriname’s bauxite sector, available at http://www.bauxietinstituut.com/ 
46  |  Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 91, octubre de 2011 
 
 
Bauxietsectoralg.aspx; last accessed 8 June 2010. 
9. Handelingen 1941-1942, 36ff. 
10. NA, AGS/KG 1885-1951, 516. See also the government missive 2131 to the Staten which gives a 
short account of the strike (Handelingen 1942-43, pp. 15-16). 
11. NA, AGS/KG 1885-1951, 516, Letter no. 58 from the DC of Marowijne to the governor, dated 5 
August 1941.  
12. NA, AGS/KG 1885-1951, 516, Letter no 64 from the DC, dated 11 August 1941. 
13. NA, AGS/KG 1885-1951, 516, Short report of the meeting on Monday 3 November 1941. 
14. Handelingen 1942-1943, Interpellation by Mr. de Miranda c.s. concerning Moengo-conflicts, p. 12. 
15. NA, AGS/KG 1885-1951, 516, Letter no. 2 from the DC, dated 10 January 1942. Cf. Interpellation 
De Miranda c.s. 11 June 1942, Handelingen 1942-1943, pp. 11-14. 
16. NA, AGS/KG 1885-1951, 516, Letter no. 4 from the DC, dated 19 January 1942. 
17. NA, AGS/KG 1885-1951, 516, Transcription of radio address by DC J. Postma on Sunday 18 Janu-
ary 1942. 
18. Letters from the S.A.F. (Surinamese Workers’ Federation) in which four of the dismissed workers 
mention a number of 80; De Miranda mentions a number of 83 dismissed workers (Handelingen, 
1942-1943, pp. 11-14). 
19. NA, AGS/KG 1885-1951, 516, Telegram from SBM, dated 22 January 1942. 
20. NA, AGS/KG 1885-1951, 516, Letter no. 4 from the DC, dated 28 January 1942. 
21. Handelingen, 1942-43, pp. 10-16. 
22. Handelingen, 1942-43, p. 12. 
23. Handelingen, 1942-43, p. 16. 
24. Nationaal Archief (NA), Gouverneur van Suriname (GS) 1951-1975, Inventory number 1211, 
Letter no. 733 by Governor Klaasesz to the Minister of ‘Overzeese Rijksdelen’, dated 30 June 
1952, with appended letters by SBxM Director Meijer reporting on the incidents, by mechanic 
Stein and the MMB to Director Meijer, and a report by staff member Ashby. 
25. NA, GS 1951-1975, 1211. 
26. NA, GS 1951-1975, 1211, Letter from Director Meijer, dated 26 June 1954.  
27. Ibidem. 
28. NA, GS 1951-1975, 1211, Letter no. 733. 
29. Ibidem. 
30. Ibidem. 
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